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THE FAILURE OF ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING 
REGULATION: WHERE IS THE COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS? 
Lanier Saperstein, Geoffrey Sant & Michelle Ng* 
INTRODUCTION 
By investigating customer identities and reporting suspicious 
transactions to regulators, banks play an important role in helping 
regulators fight financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  Yet, in a strange twist, regulators have recently been punishing 
banks where no financial crime has been identified. 
As discussed in this Practitioner Comment, the regulators1 have been 
punishing the banks not because of any actual money laundering, but rather 
because the banks did not meet the regulators’ own subjective vision of the 
ideal anti–money laundering or counter–terrorist financing program.  
However, no one has attempted to show that the supposedly ideal vision of 
an anti–money laundering or counter–terrorist financing program would 
actually be more effective than the programs the banks have in place. 
Even if the regulators’ ideal vision of an anti–money laundering and 
counter–terrorist financing program would in fact be more effective than 
what exists now, it is unclear if the benefits of such a program would 
outweigh the very serious costs.  The optimal level of banking regulation 
necessarily requires some sort of cost-benefit analysis. 
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 1  Unless otherwise specified, the term “regulators” used throughout this Practitioner 
Comment generally refers to all federal and state bank regulators. 
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Indeed, legal scholars, Congress, and the courts have long advocated 
for agencies to conduct qualitative and quantitative assessment of all 
consequences of their regulatory actions.  Under most circumstances, 
regulators should undertake an action only if its benefits outweigh its costs.  
Thus, banking regulators’ utter silence regarding the costs and benefits of 
their subjective vision is troubling, and results in bad public policy. 
I.     THE PROBLEM 
In July 2015, Citigroup agreed to pay $140 million in penalties to 
federal and California regulators for purported anti–money laundering 
weaknesses at its Banamex USA subsidiary.2  On the same day, Citigroup 
announced it would close Banamex USA.3  The two events are almost 
certainly linked, as the fine imposed on Banamex USA equaled roughly 
one-sixth of the bank’s assets.4  The closure of Banamex USA’s three 
branches, which were located in Houston, San Antonio, and Los Angeles, 
put an end to one of the oldest banks serving the U.S.-Mexican border, with 
roots stretching back to the 1800s.5 
One would assume that, for such a long-standing bank to close, the 
regulators must have caught serious instances of money laundering at 
Banamex USA.  In fact, the regulators did not identify a single instance of 
money laundering.  Rather, the regulators stated in a press release that they 
had “reason to believe” that “weaknesses” existed in Banamex USA’s 
overall compliance program.6  These weaknesses were a lack of sufficient 
staff and insufficient internal controls for preventing money laundering.7 
One year earlier, the New York Department of Financial Services—
the New York state bank regulator—imposed a $300 million fine on 
 
 2  Press Release, Citigroup, Citigroup Statement on Banamex USA (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2015/150722a.htm.   
 3  Id.  
 4  See id.; see also Jude Joffe-Block, Banamex USA Bank to Pay $140 Million Fine 
and Shut Down, KJZZ (July 23, 2015), http://kjzz.org/content/169775/banamex-usa-bank-
pay-140-million-fine-and-shut-down.   
 5  Meet Banamex, BANAMEX, 
http://www.banamex.com/en/conoce_banamex/quienes_somos/grupo_financiero_banamex.
htm?icid=Texto-ConoceBanamex-Footer-Hojadeproducto-05222013-Int-EN (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2015).  
 6  Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Bus. Oversight, DBO Announces Record $40 Million 
Settlement with Citi Subsidiary Banamex USA, Resolves Allegations of Money Laundering 
Rule Violations (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Press/press_releases/2015/Settlement_Announcement_07-22-15.pdf.  
 7  Written Agreement Between Banamex USA and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, No. FDIC-14-0259k (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Press/press_releases/2015/FDIC_DFI_Consent_Order%2008-02-
12.pdf (consent order issued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the 
California Department of Financial Institutions).  
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Standard Chartered for supposed weakness in its New York branch’s anti–
money laundering monitoring system.8  Despite imposing a massive fine—
more than double the amount that caused Banamex USA to close—the 
regulator did not identify any actual money laundering activity.  Rather, the 
regulator claimed that the bank’s monitoring system failed to flag 
“potentially high-risk transactions.”9 
II.     THE CURRENT REGULATORY CLIMATE 
Banamex USA and Standard Chartered are examples of a troubling 
trend in which regulators levy massive fines on banks even though the 
regulators do not identify any missed instances of money laundering or 
financial crimes.  In so doing, the regulators effectively are punishing 
banks for not meeting the regulators’ own subjective vision of the ideal 
anti–money laundering program. 
There is no indication that “higher” standards and the massive costs 
imposed on banks are actually effective in reducing money laundering and 
other financial crimes.  The regulators are incentivized to quickly and 
firmly address any potential money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk.  
An increased regulatory response equals greater job security for regulators, 
and more recognition and adulation from elected officials and the public.  
Yet, regulators do not bear any of the compliance costs imposed by their 
vision.  The regulators’ vision is untethered to the economic costs of 
implementing the supposedly ideal anti–money laundering program, and 
(understandably) the regulators have no incentive to determine whether the 
benefits obtained, if any, justify the increased costs imposed. 
Banamex USA and Standard Chartered represent just two of the many 
banks criticized or punished where no financial crimes were identified.  In 
2013, the Federal Reserve criticized the Bank of Montreal’s compliance 
program, asserting that it lacked “effective systems of governance and 
internal controls to adequately oversee” anti–money laundering 
compliance.10  Also in 2013, a federal regulator savaged Royal Bank of 
 
 8  Written Agreement Between Standard Chartered Bank and New York State 
Department of Financial Services, Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 
44 (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea140819.pdf.  
 9  Id. at 2. 
 10  Written Agreement Between Bank of Montreal and Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, Nos. 13-055-WA/RB-FB, 13-005-WA/RB-HC, 13-005-WA/RB-FBR, at 3 (Apr. 
29, 2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20130517a1.pdf; 
CANADIAN PRESS, U.S. Fed Warns Bank of Montreal on Anti–Money Laundering Controls, 
FIN. POST (May 17, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/u-s-
fed-warns-bank-of-montreal-on-anti-money-laundering-controls.  For an additional 
example, see Written Agreement Between BMO Harris Bank, N.A. and The Comptroller of 
the Currency, No. 2013-056 (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-
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Canada for anti–money laundering controls that the regulator called 
“unsafe and unsound.”11  In each of these instances, the regulators reserved 
the right to penalize the banks, despite not identifying any actual money 
laundering or financial crime. 
In fact, considering the difficulty of uncovering complex money 
laundering schemes, a bank’s failure to discover a financial crime does not 
necessarily mean that the bank has a weak anti–money laundering program.  
The Under Secretary of the Treasury Department acknowledged that “it is 
not possible or practical for a financial institution to detect and report every 
single potentially illicit transaction that flows through the institution.”12  
Likewise, the Financial Action Task Force stated that it does not expect “a 
‘zero failure’ approach,”13 and the director of the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network stated, “I think we can all agree that it is not possible 
for financial institutions to eliminate all risk.”14  Considering that it is 
impossible to eliminate financial crime, and regulators do not expect “zero 
failure,” it is problematic that regulators are nonetheless punishing banks 
where no financial crime has been identified. 
III.     THE COST OF COMPLIANCE IS SKY-ROCKETING 
International banks spend enormous amounts on anti–money 
laundering compliance.  HSBC recently estimated it now devotes $750 
million to $800 million per year on compliance—an amount equivalent to 
one quarter of the operating budget of its entire U.S. operations—to fight 
 
actions/ea2013-056.pdf (requiring assessment of anti–money laundering risk and controls).  
See also Robert Anello, Financial Institutions: How Much More Will You Have to Spend on 
Anti–Money Laundering Programs to Avoid Criminal Prosecution? FORBES (Oct. 24, 2012, 
10:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/10/24/financial-institutions-how-
much-more-will-you-have-to-spend-on-anti-money-laundering-programs-to-avoid-criminal-
prosecution/ (“Rather than focusing on money laundering that results from substantive 
criminal violations . . . federal prosecutors are looking instead at weaknesses in the internal 
procedures employed by financial institutions to prevent laundering.”). 
 11  See Rita Trichur & Alistair MacDonald, Canadian Regulators Increase Pressure 
on Banks to Snuff Out Money Laundering, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2015, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/canadian-regulators-increase-pressure-on-banks-to-snuff-out-
money-laundering-1423002679.   
 12  David. S. Cohen, Under Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at the 
ABA/ABA Money Laundering Enforcement Conference (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2692.aspx.  
 13  FATF Clarifies Risk-Based Approach: Case-by-Case, Not Wholesale De-Risking, 
FATF (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/rba-and-de-risking.html.  
 14  Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enf’t 
Network, Remarks at the 2014 Mid-Atlantic AML Conference (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/html/20140812.html.  
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against financial crime.15  Between 2012 and 2015, the bank added around 
5000 additional staff—about $300 million in salary—to work in 
compliance alone.16 
To a large extent, the fight against financial crimes has swallowed up 
the core business of banking, such as providing loans and banking services.  
Regulators appear to have shifted their focus to how much banks spend on 
compliance, as opposed to the effectiveness of compliance efforts.  The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency recently described it as a 
“hopeful sign[]” and “impressive” that many of the “largest banks are 
increasing spending by significant amounts and adding substantial numbers 
of employees” in anti–money laundering compliance, a “trend we want to 
encourage.”17 
IV.     DE-RISKING 
Considering the massive sums involved, one would expect the 
regulatory actions to be based on scientific studies and empirical research 
weighing the costs and benefits of their regulations and enforcement 
actions.  Instead, regulators appear to have simply assumed that higher 
standards, more employees, and increased spending from banks will 
necessarily reduce the number of financial crimes.  They may turn out to be 
right.  However, evidence to date indicates the opposite. 
Regulatory punishments and compliance costs have contributed to 
banks retreating from high-risk regions and businesses.18  This “de-risking” 
has made financial activity less transparent and more susceptible to misuse 
by criminals.  For example, all major banks in the United States and the 
 
 15  Martin Arnold, HSBC Wrestles with Soaring Costs of Compliance, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 4, 2014, 8:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e3f0760-1bef-11e4-9666-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3iT0u5kXA (identifying HSBC’s anti–money laundering 
compliance spending as $750 million to $800 million for 2014); HSBC USA, Inc., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), 37 (Feb. 23, 2015) (showing that the total amount of operating budget 
for HSBC USA in 2014 was $3,424 million). 
 16  See Laura Noonan, Banks Face Pushback over Surging Compliance and 
Regulatory Costs, FIN. TIMES (May 28, 2015, 1:46 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1323e18-0478-11e5-95ad-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3qGQrrBik (estimating that the average salary for a compliance 
staff employee is $60,000); Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: 
Dream Career?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2014, 8:13 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579250722114538750 (noting 
that HSBC Holdings added 1600 compliance employees in a single year). 
 17  Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Remarks Before the Association of Certified Anti–Money Laundering Specialists 3 (Mar. 
17, 2014), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2014/pub-speech-2014-39.pdf.  
 18  Patrick Jenkins, Banks Pull Back from Risky Regions, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2013, 
5:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47c3432a-aa5d-11e2-9a38-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3iW2MHlj4.  
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United Kingdom have abandoned wire transfers to Somalia in order to 
avoid the risk that a money transfer ends up in the hands of terrorist 
groups.19  This abandonment of Somalia by major banks has caused a 
humanitarian tragedy.  Many families in Somalia depend upon relatives 
working abroad to send money home in order to pay for food and medicine.  
Somalis living in the United States now hire third-party agents to 
physically carry the money in cash in suitcases on flights to Somalia.20  The 
money still flowing to Somalia has thus become unregulated, untraceable, 
and more expensive for Somalis living hand-to-mouth.  The end result is 
not only tragic for individual Somalis, it is also riskier for money 
laundering than if banks had continued to provide wire transfer services. 
Along the Mexican border, banks fearful of money laundering linked 
to drugs and smuggling have closed customer accounts and bank 
branches—and in one recent case, the bank itself.21  When Citigroup 
shuttered its Banamex USA subsidiary, it eliminated a banking group that 
once had eleven branches in the southwest.22  The closing of Banamex 
USA came mere months after Arizona Senators John McCain and Jeff 
Flake demanded a hearing in response to the rapid-fire closing of four bank 
branches in one Arizona border city.23  Banks have also closed long-term 
accounts of cash-intensive businesses, like ranchers and farmers, due to 
cash being risky for money laundering.24  The ironic result of closing the 
bank accounts of cash-intensive businesses, of course, is to force these 
clients to move even more heavily into cash transactions.  After all, if these 
businesses are unable to deposit cash in a bank account, then they must 
necessarily pay others in cash as well.  The move to cash has a ripple effect 
 
 19  See Jessica Hatcher, Ending Somali-U.S. Money Transfers Will Be Devastating, 
Merchants Bank Warned, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2015, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/feb/06/somali-us-money-transfers-
merchants-bank-remittances. 
 20  Jamila Trindle, Money Keeps Moving Toward Somalia, Sometimes in Suitcases, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/money-keeps-
moving-toward-somalia-sometimes-in-suitcases/.   
 21  Emily Glazer, Big Banks Shut Border Branches in Effort to Avoid Dirty Money, 
WALL ST. J. (May 25, 2015, 8:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-shut-border-
branches-in-effort-to-avoid-dirty-money-1432598865. 
 22  Joffe-Block, supra note 4. 
 23  Letter from Senator John McCain and Senator Jeff Flake to Senator Richard 
Shelby, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Feb. 10, 
2015), http://www.flake.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/9423e710-dde4-4440-b682-
7964a0e8d6c8/2-10-15-mccain-flake-letter-to-chairman-shelby-re-border-banking-1-.pdf.  
 24  See Press Release, Senator John McCain, Senator John McCain Submits Statement 
to Arizona State Senate Committee on Financial Institutions Hearing on Bank Closures 
Along Southern Border (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=80be396d-0964-460d-
a870-123ca0efe94b. 
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upon other businesses and individuals, spreading the risk of money 
laundering. 
Overseas banks worry about having too many cash-intensive business 
clients.25  For example, for fear of losing their connections to the U.S. 
banking industry, Mexican banks have sharply limited the amount of cash 
deposits they will accept from customers.26  If customers are depositing too 
much money in cash, the bank itself is seen as high-risk for money 
laundering and loses its access to the global financial system.27 
Mexico has seen an epidemic of cash-heavy businesses losing their 
bank accounts.28  Some businesses in Mexico described opening strings of 
accounts at different banks in order to disguise cash deposits.29  One 
business owner told the Associated Press that he scattered dollar deposits 
among “something like 10 banks” after Bank of America closed his 
original account.30  By forcing legitimate businesses to structure holdings 
and disguise cash flows, it becomes far harder to spot criminal networks 
doing the same thing. 
Regulatory pressure leads to serious unintended consequences, 
including forcing banks out of high-risk regions, forcing businesses to 
disguise cash holdings, and causing an overall increase in cash transactions 
and the use of underground networks to transfer funds.  In this way, 
regulators have unintentionally made it harder to catch financial crimes, 
increased opportunities for money laundering, and strengthened criminal 
networks. 
V.     WHERE’S THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS? 
To achieve an optimal regulatory regime, legal scholars have 
advocated that regulators conduct cost-benefit analyses of the purported 
benefits of regulations against alternative options.  Without such an 
analysis, regulations are at risk of being “unsuitable” and “burdensome.”31  
 
 25  See id. (noting banks’ comments that “cash-intensive accounts receive more 
scrutiny due to their perceived risk”). 
 26  Elliot Spagat, Dollars Can Be a Dirty Word at Banks on US-Mexico Border, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/nation-
world/world/article/Dollars-can-be-a-dirty-word-at-banks-on-US-Mexico-6121482.php.  
 27  See id. 
 28  Id.; Jude Joffe-Block, Border Businesses Lose Bank Accounts Amid Money-
Laundering Fears, NPR (Jan. 4, 2015, 7:46 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/01/04/374582727/border-businesses-lose-bank-accounts-amid-
money-laundering-fears.  
 29  See Spagat, supra note 26. 
 30  Id.  
 31  Mahmood Bagheri & Chizu Nakajima, Optimal Level of Financial Regulation 
Under the GATS: A Regulatory Competition and Cooperation Framework for Capital 
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As Justice Stephen Breyer once warned, when agencies “carr[y] single-
minded pursuit of a single goal too far” their actions tend to “bring about 
more harm than good.”32 
Here, the goals of the regulators are undeniably noble: to prevent 
criminals from committing crimes through financial institutions.  But as 
regulators continue to rely on punishing banks for not meeting their 
standards and constricting access to banking as a quick solution to the 
money-laundering and terrorist-financing problems, their actions actually 
result in more harm than good.33 
Legal scholars have long advocated the use of a cost-benefit analysis 
to prevent this absurd situation.  By requiring regulators to perform a 
qualitative and quantitative assessment of the costs and benefits of their 
action, regulators can objectively view the impact of their action and 
“develop a more individualized assessment of whether the regulation” 
actually helps or hurts the public.34  A regulatory action should not be 
undertaken “unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation 
outweigh the potential costs to the society.”35 
When banks spend an enormous portion of their budget on 
compliance, this money is no longer available for the core business of 
banking—providing loans and services to customers.  The cost of 
compliance is passed on to customers in higher fees and more onerous loan 
rates, which in turn hampers economic growth and hinders the creation and 
growth of new businesses.  Ironically, the most at-risk communities—
places like Somalia and the Mexican border—are the ones that find access 
to banking and the ability to grow a business cut off.36  The Los Angeles 
 
Adequacy and Disclosure of Information, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 510 (2002).  See 
generally id. (discussing methods to achieve optimal level of financial regulation).   
 32  STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 11 (1993). 
 33  For an additional example of regulatory overreach resulting in harmful 
consequences, see Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702–03 (1999) (new extensive safeguards against 
terrorism imposed after the 1996 crash of TWA flight 800—hastily proposed and 
implemented despite no indication that the crash resulted from terrorism—resulted in direct 
costs of $400 million to taxpayers and actually cost, rather than saved, more lives).   
 34  Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to Critics, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (2004); see also id. at 1031–41 (responding to criticisms of cost-
benefit studies on government Regulatory Impact Analyses).  See generally CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002) 
(arguing in favor of cost-benefit analyses of regulations). 
 35  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 
3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). 
 36  Lanier Saperstein & Geoffrey Sant, Account Closed: How Bank ‘De-Risking’ Hurts 
Legitimate Customers, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2015, 6:38 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/account-closed-how-bank-de-risking-hurts-legitimate-
customers-1439419093.  
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Times quoted an aid worker for Somali immigrants as stating that “people 
are not going to eat” due to the ending of bank transfers to Somalia.37  
Oxfam International stated in a press release earlier this year that three 
million Somalis may starve, blaming “bank account closures that have been 
largely driven by government regulation.”38 
Last year, a report by the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform revealed that the Department of Justice was 
attempting to “choke[] off” legitimate companies and businesses 
considered “high-risk” or otherwise objectionable, despite the fact that they 
are legal businesses.39  The report noted that senior government officials 
pressured banks to deny services to money-service businesses because the 
money-service industry was considered “high-risk.”40  The staff report 
noted that the regulators’ delineation of high-risk businesses “had no 
articulated rationale” and was based on “spurious claims.”41  Even fellow 
regulators recognized that Operation Choke Point incentivized banks to act 
on “perceived regulatory risk, rather than in response to an assessment of 
the actual risk of illicit activity.”42 
The regulatory crackdown also propels the trend towards “too-big-to-
fail” banks.  After all, smaller banks lack the economy of scale needed to 
implement massive anti–money laundering programs.  In addition, 
increased regulation fragments the global financial system by denying 
banks in some regions access to other regions. 
U.S. regulators appear to assume that a massive increase in 
compliance spending by banks will reduce financial crime without any 
negative side effects.  In fact, spending on safety always involves trade-
offs.  To fight underage drinking, one could force bars to spend a large 
portion of their operating budget on checking customer IDs.  Yet the trade-
offs would be increased prices and enormous financial barriers to entry for 
new businesses.  It is also unclear whether underage drinking would 
 
 37  E. Scott Reckard & Ronald D. White, Money Transfers Cut Off to Somalia, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-merchants-bank-
somalia-20150206-story.html.  
 38  Press Release, Oxfam Int’l, As the Cycle of Crisis Continues in Somalia, Vital 
Remittance Pipelines Risk Being Cut (Feb. 19, 2015), 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2015-02-19/cycle-crisis-continues-
somalia-vital-remittance-pipelines-risk.  
 39  See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION’S INVOLVEMENT IN “OPERATION CHOKE POINT” 
3–4 (Comm. Print 2014), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Staff-
Report-FDIC-and-Operation-Choke-Point-12-8-2014.pdf (describing the standards used by 
FDIC to identify high-risk merchants). 
 40  Id. at 12–17. 
 41  Id. at 6–7. 
 42  Id. at 20. 
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actually be curbed.  The same trade-offs occur when regulators require 
banks to spend massive amounts on investigating customers. 
There is only one sure way to completely eliminate the risk of banks 
being misused for money laundering or terrorist financing activity: end 
banking activity.  Somewhere between the two extremes of closing banks 
and giving banks free reign is the optimal level of banking regulation.  Yet 
regulators have not yet pinned down this optimal point, and as the 
Banamex USA example illustrates, the regulators appear to have drifted too 
far to one extreme. 
CONCLUSION 
Banks are subject to new rules and ever-increasing compliance 
standards, including new benchmarks to evaluate the “adequacy and 
robustness” of their monitoring systems.43  Bank executives have even 
been held personally liable for compliance failures.44  Yet, as the massive 
new compliance costs continue to pile upon banks, no analysis has been 
done to determine whether their efforts are effective, and whether the 
benefits, if any, are worth the cost. 
It is natural for bank regulators—who focus almost exclusively on 
fighting financial crimes—to overvalue this fight and to undervalue the 
resulting financial and humanitarian harms.  It is also natural for them to 
assume that increased bank spending on compliance must always be a good 
thing.  Their perspective is understandable.  Yet before regulators impose 
policy choices upon banks, they should have a valid basis for doing so.  
Before regulators push “higher” standards and increased spending upon 
banks, they should analyze whether those efforts actually reduce financial 
crime, and if so, whether that benefit justifies the costs. 
 
 43  Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Servs., N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 
Financial Federalism: The Catalytic Role of State Regulators in a Post-Financial Crisis 
World (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches/sp150225.htm. 
 44  See, e.g., Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, Thomas E. Haider, No. 2014-08 
(Dep’t of the Treasury Dec. 18, 2014) (assessment of civil money penalty by the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)), 
https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/Haider_Assessment.pdf (federal regulators 
imposed a $1 million fine on the Chief Compliance Officer of MoneyGram for his failure to 
establish and implement an effective anti–money laundering program and to report 
suspicious activity as required under the Bank Secrecy Act); Complaint, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury v. Haider, No. 14 CV 9987 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014) (seeking to enforce the civil 
money penalty and to enjoin Mr. Haider from employment in the financial industry); see 
also Written Agreement Between Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (FINRA) and Brown 
Brothers Harriman & Co., No. 2013035821404 (Feb. 4, 2014) (letter of acceptance, waiver, 
and consent), http://www.frank-cs.org/cms/pdfs/FINRA/FINRA_BBH_Action_5.2.14.pdf 
(Chief Compliance Officer of a broker-dealer institution was penalized for failing to 
adequately implement a monitoring program to detect and flag suspicious penny stock 
transactions). 
